Visual Phenomenology

Table Of Contents

Preface xi
Acknowledgments xiii
Abbreviations xv
Part I 1
1 Introduction 3
1.1 The Main Argument 3
1.2 The Sandwich or the Cycle? 5
1.3 Same Strategy, Different Results 12
2 Three Constraints 27
2.1 Visual Experience Is Perspectival 28
2.2 Visual Experience Is Temporal 32
2.3 Visual Experience Is Indeterminate 36
2.4 Thesis AF and the Three Constraints 38
3 Anticipation and Fulfillment 41
3.1 (PC) and Siegel’s Doll 41
3.2 (PC ′) and Five Points about Anticipation 43
3.3 Variation in Perceptual Content 54
3.4 Visual Anticipation and Two Distinctions 56
3.5 Summary 57
4 The Question of Content 59
4.1 Introducing AF Content 59
4.2 Alternative Theories of Content and Their Shortcomings 65
4.3 On the Denial of Perceptual Content 70
4.4 Four Problems and Three Solutions 75
4.5 Summary 86
Part II 89
5 Some Perceptual Psychology 91
5.1 Various Strands of Support 92
5.2 Rejecting the Myth of Full Detail 96
5.3 The Importance of Action 99
5.4 Facing the Resistance 103
5.5 Visual Attention 111
5.6 Objections and Replies 117
5.7 Summary 118
6 The Active Brain 119
6.1 Ongoing Cortical Dynamics 119
6.2 Neural Feedback 123
6.3 Theoretical Options 125
6.4 Summary 128
7 The Dorsal Stream and the Visual Horizon 131
7.1 Visual Consciousness and the Two Streams 131
7.2 Introducing the Visual Horizon 134
7.3 Input to the Dorsal Stream 136
7.4 Localized Damage and Illusions 138
7.5 Disturbances of Visual Motion 145
7.6 Computational Models of Dorsal Anticipation 149
Part III 153
8 The Convergence 155
8.1 Back to the Main Argument 155
8.2 The Best of Both Worlds—Symbolic Dynamics 160
8.3 Do We Need Internal Representations? 162
9 Seeing Our World 165
9.1 AF Content Is of a Shared Social World 165
9.2 Empirical Support 170
9.3 Embedded Rationality 174
Appendix: Husserl’s Phenomenology 177
A.1 Finding AF in Husserl 177
A.2 Descriptive Psychology or Transcendental Phenomenology? 180
A.3 Phenomenology and the Sciences of the Mind 184
Notes 191
References 203
Index 241