Anticipating Instability

ENDORSEMENTS

“This is a pathbreaking book. Bueno de Mesquita and Smith have developed ways of understanding two issues central to political leadership, especially in dictatorships: leaders’ preemptive responses to challenges that have not yet materialized, and the way leaders’ personal time horizons affect the decisions made by their closest supporters, and thus leader survival and regime longevity. Everyone interested in how dictatorships work, regime change, or democratic backsliding should read this book.”
—Barbara Geddes, Professor Emerita, University of California, Los Angeles

“Anticipating Instability is a tour de force. Expanding their influential selectorate theory, Bueno de Mesquita and Smith show why it’s not coups or revolutions—but rather the fear of them—that explains the policies, institutions, and survival of autocrats and democrats alike. Unified by a single, powerful political logic, this book is a master class in both the realities and the science of politics.”
—Milan Svolik, Professor, Yale University; author of The Politics of Authoritarian Rule

“This book has a remarkable aim: to understand episodes of political instability that did not occur due to forward-looking actions. To do so, they extend their influential selectorate theory into new domains, explaining along the way why the apparently irrational may sometimes serve a strategic purpose. The book is a significant feat demonstrating the power of formal modelling in understanding issues that matter.”
—Tim Besley, School Professor of Economics and Political Science, London School of Economics and Political Science

“A major advance in our understanding of political economy. Essential reading in our uncertain and perilous world.”
—James A. Robinson, 2024 Nobel Prize Winner; Professor, University of Chicago

“Anticipating Instability extends selectorate theory to consider rulers who are constantly on the lookout for nascent threats to their continuation in office. This work will be required reading for all those interested in authoritarian politics and the slippery slope between democracies and nondemocracies.”
—Gary W. Cox, William Bennett Munro Professor of Political Science, Stanford University

“From modeling Putin’s bare chest to an incredibly rich set of political strategies, Bueno de Mesquita and Smith extend their influential selectorate theory to account for previously unexamined cases where political action is explained as moves by leaders to prevent their deposition. Mathematical at root, empirical for support, and anecdotal for engagement, this challenging book is a whirlwind of insight.”
—David D. Laitin, James T. Watkins IV and Elise V. Watkins Professor of Political Science, Stanford University

“What drives the behavior of autocrats, and how do they manage to consolidate and retain power? This important book provides an illuminating framework to answer this fundamental question. Combining theory, evidence, and historical analysis, it provides simple but compelling explanations of complex political events. A really pathbreaking contribution to understand what is going on in many parts of the world. “
—Guido Tabellini, Intesa Sanpaolo Chair in Political Economics, Bocconi University